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System Shock: Fontenot Shows Why North Carolina's
Contributory Negligence Rule Must Go*
Only five United States jurisdictions remain shackled to the
ancient, draconian rule of contributory negligence.' North Carolina is
one of them.2
Since 1869,1 contributory negligence has barred North Carolina
plaintiffs from recovering in negligence suits when the plaintiff's own
negligence contributed to his injuries.! Under this all-or-nothing rule,s
even defendants who are ninety-nine percent at fault can completely
escape liability for their wrongdoing, while plaintiffs who are merely
one percent at fault are prohibited from recovering any damages.6
Forty-six states abolished the contributory negligence doctrine prior
to or during the twentieth century;' North Carolina codified it in
* @ 2014 Hailey M. Bunce.
1. Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1160 n.3 (Md. 2013) (listing
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia); see Peter
Nash Swisher, Virginia Should Abolish the Archaic Tort Defense of Contributory
Negligence and Adopt a Comparative Negligence Defense in Its Place, 46 U. RICH. L. REV.
359, 366 (2011) ("Comparative negligence clearly is the better-reasoned solution to an
archaic and obsolete nineteenth century doctrine of contributory negligence in fostering
and furthering bedrock tort law principles...."); id. at 367 n.45 ("There are no serious
commentators today who would argue that the archaic contributory negligence defense is
superior in any way to comparative negligence in contemporary American tort law.").
2. Coleman, 69 A.3d at 1160 n.3.
3. Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare
Decisis in North Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (citing Morrison v. Cornelius,
63 N.C. 346, 348-51 (1869)). North Carolina had already recognized the rule in dicta for
two decades, id. (citing Herring v. Wilmington & Raleigh R.R. Co., 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 402,
409 (1849) (per curiam), and the rule had made its first official appearance elsewhere even
earlier in 1809, Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809) ("A party is
not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and
avail himself of it, if he do [sic] not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the
right."). One might even say contributory negligence is downright biblical. John 8:7
(Geneva Bible) ("Let him that is among you without sin[], cast the first stone . . .. ").
4. Champs Convenience Stores, Inc. v. United Chem. Co., 329 N.C. 446, 455, 406
S.E.2d 856, 861 (1991) (" '[T]he breach of the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care for
his own safety in respect of the occurrence about which he complains, and if his failure to
exercise due care for his own safety is one of the proximate contributing causes of his injury,
it will bar recovery.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Holderfield v. Rummage Bros. Trucking
Co., 232 N.C. 623, 625, 61 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1950))).
5. Gardner, supra note 3, at 6.
6. Allison P. Raney, Note, Stacy v. Jedco Construction, Inc.: North Carolina Adopts
a Diminished Capacity Standard for Contributory Negligence, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1215,1220 (1996).
7. Gardner, supra note 3, at 3.
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1979.8 Under North Carolina's Products Liability Act, a product
manufacturer or seller cannot be held liable in a negligence suit if the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in the use of the product.9
The Act's power to completely insulate manufacturers and
sellers from being held accountable for their products shocked the
Fourth Circuit in Fontenot v. Taser Int'l, Inc.'o The case involved a
seventeen-year-old boy who died after a police officer tased him in
the chest for forty-two seconds." The victim's mother sued the taser
manufacturer for failing to warn law enforcement officers that cardiac
harm could result from tasing near the heart. 2 The manufacturer
argued contributory negligence, claiming the boy instigated and
prolonged his own tasing with his aggressive behavior." The Fourth
Circuit noted, however, that because contributory negligence would
be present "in nearly every instance in which a taser is deployed by a
law enforcement officer," allowing that defense would leave the
manufacturer with "no duty in North Carolina to safely design its
products or to provide adequate warnings to law enforcement
customers. . . .""4 Realizing contributory negligence would likely
immunize the manufacturer against most negligence suits involving its
tasers, the Fourth Circuit held that to be contributorily negligent
under North Carolina's Products Liability Act, a plaintiff himself
must have actually used the product." Because the victim in Fontenot
merely had the taser used on him, he could not have been
contributorily negligent; thus, his mother could recover against the
manufacturer."
The majority's holding in Fontenot is better seen as an attempt to
avoid an unpleasant policy outcome-the unaccountability of the
taser manufacturer-than as a faithful interpretation of North
Carolina law. As Chief Judge William Traxler pointed out in his
dissent, contributory negligence laws like North Carolina's are
8. Products Liability Act, ch. 654, § 99B-4(3), 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687, 688-89
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2013)).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2013) ("No manufacturer or seller shall be held
liable in any product liability action if ... [tihe claimant failed to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances in the use of the product, and such failure was a proximate cause
of the occurrence that caused the injury or damage complained of.").
10. 736 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2013); see also infra Part II.A.
11. Id. at 321, 323.
12. Id. at 321-22.
13. Id. at 322-23.
14. Id. at 331.
15. Id. at 330-31.
16. Id. at 331.
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intended to be harsh." This Recent Development argues that the best
way to remedy that harshness is not to carve out exceptions to the
rule, but instead to carve out the rule itself.
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines contributory
negligence, contrasts the law with comparative negligence, explores
North Carolina's common law approach to contributory negligence,
and addresses the codification of this approach in North Carolina's
Products Liability Act. Part II examines the facts and the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of North Carolina's contributory negligence
law in Fontenot. Part III argues that the Fourth Circuit's "use" rule is
the least unfaithful interpretation of North Carolina law that the
majority could offer, given that the majority's other arguments for
why contributory negligence should not apply are even clearer
contradictions of state law and the facts of Fontenot. Part IV
demonstrates that the Fourth Circuit's "use" rule is overbroad
compared to the policy the Fourth Circuit was trying to advance, and
that applying the rule to certain fact patterns leads to outcomes
antithetical to the goal of contributory negligence. This Recent
Development concludes by suggesting that North Carolina follow the
other forty-six states that have abolished contributory negligence and
replace it with the "greater than 50%" approach of comparative
negligence.
I. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A. Contributory Negligence vs. Comparative Negligence
Before diving into an analysis of Fontenot, some background on
contributory negligence and its counterpart, comparative negligence,
is helpful. Ancient moral law invites only those without sin to cast the
first stone." But we are sinners all,' 9 and in the legal realm, many
plaintiffs file negligence suits with unclean hands. States have taken
different approaches in deciding how to proceed when both the
plaintiff and the defendant contributed to the plaintiff's harm. The
vast majority of states require that jurors compare the fault of both
parties and limit the plaintiff's recovery based on the amount of his
fault.20 In four states and the District of Columbia, however, any
amount of fault on the plaintiff's part will, as a matter of law,
17. See id. at 343 n.7 (Traxier, C.J., dissenting).
18. John 8:7 (Geneva).
19. Romans 3:23 (Geneva).
20. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 3, 6.
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completely prevent the plaintiff from recovering at all.2 1 Under such
contributory negligence schemes, minimally negligent plaintiffs
recover nothing, while incredibly negligent defendants escape
liability.2 2
A driving force behind contributory negligence is the "centuries
old sentiment that a plaintiff should not benefit by his or her own
negligence . .. . ."2 The rule has also been described as "a common
sense approach to tort recovery keeping in mind the costs of running
businesses, manufacturing products, and providing services to its
citizens." 24 Some proponents also point to research demonstrating
"dramatic" increases in insurance rates in comparative negligence
jurisdictions.25 Other proponents characterize the one percent
negligent plaintiff as the snow leopard of torts plaintiffs and cry
"strawman" at arguments against contributory negligence based on
the rule's harsh treatment of this elusive creature.2 6
Undeterred by these arguments, forty-six states have abandoned
contributory negligence and replaced it with some form of
comparative negligence.27 Under "pure" comparative negligence, any
negligent plaintiff--even a plaintiff equally or more negligent than
the defendant-may recover, but the recovery is reduced by the
amount of the plaintiff's negligence.28 Meanwhile, under "modified"
comparative negligence, a negligent plaintiff can recover only if the
plaintiff's negligence does not exceed a certain threshold.29 Under the
"greater than 50%" approach, the plaintiff can recover only if his
negligence does not exceed the defendant's; under the "50% or
greater" approach, the plaintiff can recover only if his negligence
neither exceeds nor equals the defendant's.3 0
21. See Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1160 n.3 (Md. 2013)
(listing Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia).
22. Raney, supra note 6, at 1220.
23. William B. L. Little, "It Is Much Easier to Find Fault with Others, than to Be
Faultless Ourselves": Contributory Negligence As a Bar to a Claim for Breach of the
Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 81, 95 (2007).
24. John P. Marshall, The Battle at Little Big Horn Has Moved to Raleigh - Is This
Custer's Last Stand Against Tort Reform?, 10 CAMPBELL L.REv. 439,443 (1988).
25. Little, supra note 23, at 94-95 (citing Gardner, supra note 3, at 47-48).
26. Id. at 92-93 (citing Richard T. Boyette, A Case Against Comparative Negligence,
N.C. ST. B.Q., Fall 1991, at 23).
27. Gardner, supra note 3, at 3.
28. Swisher, supra note 1, at 365 ("Twelve states, and many federal statutes, have
adopted a pure comparative negligence regime.").
29. Id.
30. Id. at 365-66 (noting that twenty-one states follow the "greater than 50%"
approach while twelve follow the "50% or greater" approach).
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Proponents of comparative negligence criticize contributory
negligence as equal parts anachronistic and inequitable.' Scholars
note that the harsh all-or-nothing rule was imported into the United
States at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution as a way to "protect
infant American industries" by insulating employers of railroad and
factory workers from the scorn of "overly sympathetic juries" in
personal injury cases.32 These scholars argue that workers'
compensation and comparative negligence have now rendered
contributory negligence unnecessary." More fundamentally, however,
some scholars have deemed contributory negligence to be antithetical
to the fault-based liability concept underlying tort law because it
allows an at-fault party to escape all liability.' This policy problem
was what most troubled the Fourth Circuit in Fontenot."
B. North Carolina's Approach to Contributory Negligence
First slapped on a North Carolina plaintiff in 1869,6 the
contributory negligence defense is still alive and well in the state.
Under North Carolina case law, "[a] plaintiff is contributorily
negligent when he fails to exercise such care as an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise under the circumstances in order to avoid
injury."" Such a plaintiff will be barred from recovering in a
negligence suit if his failure to exercise ordinary care was a proximate
cause of his injury.38 For example, in Braswell v. N.C. A & T State
31. Id. at 362-63.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 363-64.
34. Id. at 366-67 ("Liability based on fault is the cornerstone of tort law, and a system
such as contributory negligence-which permits one of the contributing wrongdoers to
avoid all liability-simply does not serve any principle of fault liability." (quoting 3
STUART M. SPIESER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 13:5, at 522-23 (2008))).
35. See Fontenot v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 736 F.3d 318, 331 (4th Cir. 2013) ("Accepting TI's
argument would have additional significant consequences, as TI would essentially have no
duty in North Carolina to safely design its products or to provide adequate warnings to
law enforcement customers....We do not think that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina would create such an extreme result....For these reasons, we hold that the
district court did not err in precluding TI from asserting contributory negligence as an
affirmative defense.").
36. See Morrison v. Cornelius, 63 N.C. 346, 347-48 (1869).
37. Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 346 N.C. 767, 772, 488 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1997)
(quoting Newton v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 342 N.C. 554, 564, 467 S.E.2d 58, 65
(1996)).
38. Champs Convenience Stores, Inc. v. United Chem. Co., 329 N.C. 446, 455, 406
S.E.2d 856, 861 (1991) (" 'The breach of the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care for
his own safety in respect of the occurrence about which he complains, and if his failure to
exercise due care for his own safety is one of the proximate contributing causes of his injury,
2015] 627
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University,9 the North Carolina Court of Appeals prohibited
recovery for a plaintiff who joined a mob trying to force open gym
doors at a public dance.4 A security officer negligently fired a gun at
the ground to disperse the mob, and a ricocheting bullet struck the
plaintiff, seriously injuring him.' The court first held that the
plaintiff's decision to join the mob constituted contributory
negligence because "a reasonably prudent person, in the exercise of
due care for his own safety, would not participate in mob action" that
was "clearly" illegal and "contrary to reasonable conduct."42 Second,
the court held that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was a
proximate cause of his injuries because "the illegal conduct of the
mob ... was such as would reasonably be calculated to provoke the
security officer into taking some action to disperse the mob."4 3 The
Braswell court noted that in joining the mob, the "plaintiff assumed
the risk of whatever injury he might receive as a result."" A few years
after Braswell, the Supreme Court of North Carolina explained that
"[iut is not required that the injury in the precise form in which it
occurred should have been foreseeable but only that, in the exercise
of reasonable care, consequences of a generally injurious nature might
have been expected."45
Section 99B-4 of North Carolina's Products Liability Act codifies
this common law contributory negligence rule as it applies specifically
to products liability cases.46 Enacted in 197911 and amended in 1995,48
the relevant portion of the Act currently reads, "No manufacturer or
seller shall be held liable in any product liability action if[] ... [t]he
claimant failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in
the use of the product, and such failure was a proximate cause of the
occurrence that caused the injury or damage complained of."49
it will bar recovery.' " (emphasis added) (quoting Holderfield v. Rummage Bros. Trucking
Co., 232 N.C. 623, 625, 61 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1950))).
39. 5 N.C. App. 1, 168 S.E.2d 24 (1969).
40. Id. at 10, 168 S.E.2d at 29.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 12, 168 S.E.2d at 30.
43. Id. at 12, 168 S.E.2d at 31.
44. Id.
45. McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 236, 192 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1972) (emphasis
added).
46. Products Liability Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (2013).
47. Products Liability Act, ch. 654, § 99B-4(3), 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687, 689 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2013)).
48. Act to Amend the Law Regarding Products Liability, ch. 522, sec. 1, § 99B-4(3),
1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1872, 1874 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B (2013)).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-43 (2013).
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina has made clear that the
purpose of the Act was to "merely codify the doctrine of contributory
negligence as it applies to actions brought under Ch. 99B"so-not to
make new rules for contributory negligence in products liability
cases.s' Thus, the standard for contributory negligence in claims
brought under the Act and the standard for contributory negligence
in claims brought under the common law are one and the same." It
should follow, then, that had the Braswell plaintiff attempted to bring
a negligence claim under North Carolina's Products Liability Act
against the gun's manufacturer, he would have been barred from
recovery just as he was in his common law negligence claim against
the security officer. After all, "[i]n a product liability action founded
on negligence, '[tihere is no doubt that ... [a plaintiff's] contributory
negligence will-bar his recovery to the same extent as in any other
negligence case.' "I
The Fontenot court did not get the memo.
II. FONTENOT V. TASER INT'L, INC.
A. Facts
"F**k the police," he told the officer.54
His name was Darryl Wayne Turner." He was seventeen years
old and he had just been fired from a Charlotte Food Lion for
50. Champs Convenience Stores, Inc. v. United Chem. Co., 329 N.C. 446, 453, 406
S.E.2d 856, 860 (1991) (explaining that the only contribution the Act was intended to
make to North Carolina's contributory negligence law was a "set[ing] out or expla[nation
of] more specialized fact patterns which would amount to contributory negligence in a
products liability action"); see also Jones v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 69 F.3d 712,
721 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[Tjhe North Carolina Supreme Court has expressly stated on two
occasions that [the Act] is a codification of contributory negligence . . . .").
51. Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 346 N.C. 767, 773, 448 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1997)
("[The Act] does not create a different rule for products liability actions; it clarifies the
common law contributory negligence standard with respect to these actions.").
52. See Jones, 69 F.3d at 720 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) ("A contrary holding would
contravene the intent of the North Carolina legislature ... and impose a standard of
contributory negligence for products liability actions that differs from the general common
law."); see also Nicholson, 346 N.C. at 773, 488 S.E.2d at 244 ("Thus, contributory
negligence in the context of a products liability action operates as a bar to recovery in the
same manner as in an ordinary negligence action.").
53. Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 672, 268 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1980)
(quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 670 (4th ed.
1971)).
54. Fontenot v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 736 F.3d 318, 337 (4th Cir. 2013) (Traxler, C.J.,
dissenting).
55. Id. at 321 (majority opinion).
2015] 629
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insubordination.s6 Refusing to leave, arguing loudly, and acting
aggressively, Turner was approached by a police officer." In response
to Turner's behavior, the officer removed his taser from his holster."
He asked Turner to calm down, but Turner refused." Acting as he
had been trained to do, the officer aimed his taser at Turner's chest.'
Turner looked down.6 ' He saw where the taser's laser dot was
hovering on his shirt.62 Undeterred, he advanced towards the officer
with a "swaggerly, macho type of walk" and clenched fists. 63 The
officer deployed the taser." One of the taser's two darts lodged near
Turner's ribcage, the other at the center of Turner's chest, very near
his heart.65 Instead of collapsing as the officer expected, Turner
continued walking around the store, ignoring the officer's instructions
to get down,66 and at one point even picking up a metal rack and
throwing it.67 Meanwhile, the officer continued to hold down the
taser's trigger.?
The taser, manufactured by a company called Taser
International, Inc. ("TI"), 69 had two darts that, upon making contact
with a human target like Turner, formed a circuit that delivered an
electrical current designed to "incapacitate" the target. 0 TI's training
materials explicitly stated that its tasers had no effect on a target's
heart rate." The materials even instructed users to aim for the middle
of a target's chest.72
But TI knew its training materials were wrong. 3 Two years
earlier, TI had been informed of studies indicating that use of its
tasers near a target's heart could cause ventricular fibrillation, "the
most serious cardiac rhythm disturbance" that can result from a
56. Id. at 321-22.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 337 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 337-38.
64. Id. at 323 (majority opinion).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 337 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 323 (majority opinion).
69. Id. at 321.
70. Id. at 323 n.1.
71. Id. at 323-24.
72. Id. at 324.
73. Id. at 324-25.
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disordering of the heart's electrical activity.74 Nevertheless, TI failed
to alter its training materials to warn its customers-primarily law
enforcement agencies-of this risk and against deploying their tasers
on a target's chest.75
After being tased in the chest for forty-two seconds, Darryl
Wayne Turner collapsed and died from ventricular fibrillation. 6
Turner's mother, as the administrator of Turner's estate, sued TI for
negligence under North Carolina's Products Liability Act.n TI,
relying on the Act's contributory negligence defense, argued Turner's
instigation of the dispute and failure to comply with the officer's
orders freed TI from any liability."
B. The Fourth Circuit's Decision
The Fourth Circuit refused to accept this "extreme result."79 TI's
products, the majority noted, were specifically designed and marketed
for use against citizens like Turner who engage in disputes and refuse
to submit to authority.' Allowing such behavior to constitute
contributory negligence would mean that the citizens most likely to
be injured by TI's products would be automatically barred from suit.8'
With so many of the likely victims of its negligence unable to hold it
accountable for its products, TI "essentially would have no duty in
North Carolina to safely design its products or to provide adequate
warnings to law enforcement customers."82 Determined to avoid this
unpleasant outcome, the majority interpreted North Carolina's
Products Liability Act in a way that would allow Turner's estate to
subvert North Carolina's contributory negligence rule.83
Asserting that the Fontenot facts raised an issue of first
impression under North Carolina law, the majority set out to
determine how the Supreme Court of North Carolina would decide
the case.' Drawing on principles of statutory construction, the
majority first noted that it could not interpret any part of North
74. Id. at 323 n.2.
75. Id. at 324-25.
76. Id. at 323.
77. Id. at 321-22.
78. Id. at 322.
79. Id. at 331 ("We do not think that the Supreme Court of North Carolina would
create such an extreme result based on the facts presented here.").
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 326.
2015] 631
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Carolina's Products Liability Act as "mere surplusage."' Second,
because the majority considered the Act "unambiguous," it refused to
consider the Act's legislative history in its interpretation. Finally, the
majority maintained it could not "expand" North Carolina common
law by creating new rules for new fact patterns not found in prior
North Carolina cases."
Armed with these principles, the majority shot down TI's
proposed interpretation of the Act.' The Act itself states that a
plaintiff may not recover against a manufacturer if the plaintiff "failed
to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in the use of the
product, and such failure was a proximate cause of the occurrence
that caused the injury or damage complained of.""" Under TI's
interpretation, where a plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care
while a product is in use, and the plaintiff's failure contributed to his
injuries, contributory negligence should bar the plaintiff from
recovering regardless of whether the plaintiff or someone else was the
one using the product.0 In support of its interpretation, TI cited the
North Carolina legislature's 1995 amendment of the Act.9' In 1995,
the legislature amended the Act by replacing "in his [the plaintiff's]
use of the product" with "in the use of the product."'
The majority found that TI's interpretation violated all three
principles of statutory construction. First, TI's interpretation "would
render superfluous or redundant the phrase 'in the use of the
product.' "I The only way to avoid this superfluity and redundancy,
argued the majority, is to read the Act as requiring that the plaintiff
85. Id. at 327 ("We are guided by the principle of statutory construction that a statute
should be 'construed, if possible, so that none of its provisions shall be rendered useless or
redundant.' ") (quoting Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556,
276 S.E.2d 443,447 (1981)).
86. Id. at 328 ("[UInder North Carolina law, a court interpreting a statute may rely on
the statute's legislative history only in instances in which the statutory language is
ambiguous.... [T]he language of Section 99B-4(3) is unambiguous...." (citing In re
Vogler Realty, Inc., 365 N.C. 389, 392, 722 S.E.2d 459, 462 (2012))).
87. Id. at 331 ("[I1n construing the common law of a state, we have declined to expand
state common law principles to encompass novel circumstances when the courts of that
state have not done so first." (citing Time Warner Entm't-Advance/Newhouse P'ship v.
Carteret-Craven Elec. Membership Corp., 506 F.3d 304, 314-15 (4th Cir. 2007))).
88. Id. at 327.
89. Products Liability Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2013).
90. Fontenot, 736 F.3d at 327-28.
91. Id.
92. Act to Amend the Law Regarding Products Liability, ch. 522, sec. 1, § 99B-4(3),
1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1872,1874 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (2013))
(emphasis added).
93. Fontenot, 736 F.3d at 327 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (1979)).
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used the product.' Second, TI's interpretation would ask the court to
consider the Act's legislative history, which the court can do only
when a statute is ambiguous;" the majority did not find North
Carolina's Products Liability Act ambiguous." Finally, given the
absence of cases permitting the defense under the novel
circumstances presented in Fontenot, TI's interpretation would
impermissibly extend North Carolina common law.97
Limiting itself to a plain-meaning analysis, the majority
interpreted North Carolina's Products Liability Act as prohibiting the
defense of contributory negligence when the plaintiff did not himself
"use" the product in question.98 Under the majority's interpretation,
TI could not raise the contributory negligence defense because
Turner never "used" the taser that killed him-he merely had it used
on him by the police officer.
The majority also mentioned two additional reasons, both
relating to proximate cause, for denying TI the contributory
negligence defense. First, the majority noted that Turner died because
the taser's electrical force was applied to his chest rather than to other
parts of his body, but nothing Turner did caused the officer to aim the
taser at his chest." Second, the majority suggested that because "the
record is devoid of any evidence that [Turner] knew or should have
known that police deployment of the taser could cause him to suffer
severe cardiac injury[,]" none of Turner's actions could have
foreseeably led to his death."
III. WHY FONTENOT GOT IT WRONG
The Fourth Circuit's holding-that to be contributorily negligent
in a products liability case, the plaintiff himself must have used the
product-is better seen as a forced effort to avoid the unpleasant
policy outcome demanded by Turner's undeniably contributorily
negligent behavior than as a faithful interpretation of North Carolina
law. The majority's concern regarding what it perceived to be TI's
nearly complete immunity from negligence suits-particularly the
majority's refusal to believe "that the Supreme Court of North
94. Id.
95. Id. at 328.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 331.
98. Id. at 327.
99. Id. at 330.
100. Id. at 329.
2015] 633
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Carolina would create such an extreme result"'-flies in the face of
North Carolina's decision to have a contributory negligence rule
notorious for producing extreme results.'" This irony was not lost on
Chief Judge Traxler, who in his dissent noted that the Fourth Circuit's
job "is not ... to judge the wisdom of North Carolina's rule from a
policy standpoint, but only to apply it.""o3 By refusing to apply the
rule in product liability suits where the plaintiff has not actually used
the product, the majority not only contradicted the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, but also arguably created a new rule in violation of its
own principles of statutory construction.
As Chief Judge Traxler noted, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has made it clear that the Products Liability Act did not
create new contributory negligence rules for products liability cases,
and that contributory negligence applies in cases brought under the
Products Liability Act in the same way it applies in other negligence
cases based in common law.'" Meanwhile, North Carolina common
law makes it clear that application of the contributory negligence
defense requires only two things: (1) the plaintiff act contrary to the
way a reasonably prudent person would act; and (2) the plaintiff's
actions be a proximate cause of his injuries.'05 In a products liability
negligence suit, the North Carolina courts have never imposed a third
requirement that the plaintiff "used" the product.'"
101. Id. at 331 ("We do not think that the Supreme Court of North Carolina would
create such an extreme result based on the facts presented here.").
102. Id. at 343 n.7 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting) ("Because officers generally use their
tasers only against suspects who are acting unreasonably, it is true that North Carolina's
contributory negligence rule would usually prevent recovery under a negligence theory for
these suspects' resulting injuries. However, that is simply the consequence of North
Carolina's hard, all-or-nothing contributory negligence rule.").
103. Id.
104. Id. at 340 ("Fontenot argues that if we do not construe 'in the use of the product'
to limit the type of negligence on the part of a claimant that can bar recovery, we are
essentially reading that language out of the statute.... Unfortunately for Fontenot,
however, her argument is clearly in conflict with the North Carolina Supreme Court,
which has construed the statute as merely codifying preexisting common law rules and
establishing their application in certain particularized fact patterns without making any
new rules for products liability cases."); supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
105. Champs Convenience Stores, Inc. v. United Chem. Co., 329 N.C. 446, 455, 406
S.E.2d 856, 861 (1991) (" '[Tlhe breach of the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care for
his own safety in respect of the occurrence about which he complains, and if his failure to
exercise due care for his own safety is one of the proximate contributing causes of his injury,
it will bar recovery.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Holderfield v. Rummage Bros. Trucking
Co., 232 N.C. 623, 625, 61 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1950))).
106. See Fontenot, 736 F.3d at 342 n.6 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tlhere is no case
refusing to apply contributory negligence under North Carolina law on the basis that the
plaintiff was not the user of the product.").
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Indeed, Chief Judge Traxler argued that the majority's
interpretation of North Carolina's Products Liability Act resembles
an interpretation of the Act the Fourth Circuit previously rejected on
grounds that it wrongly focused on the plaintiffs' use of the product.'07
In Jones v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,'" workers, after
developing lung cancer while working at a plant that manufactured
industrial boilers insulated with asbestos, sued the asbestos
manufacturer.'" The Fourth Circuit concluded that the workers' long-
term smoking, which "operated in combination-i.e.,
'synergistically'-with their asbestos exposure to increase
dramatically their risk of getting lung cancer," constituted
contributory negligence."o Reading the plain language of the statute
in its entirety, rather than one section in isolation, and in light of "the
definitive interpretation placed thereon by the North Carolina
Supreme Court," the Fourth Circuit found it irrelevant that the
plaintiffs were not "using" the asbestos "per se.". Rather,
recognizing that "the North Carolina Supreme Court has expressly
stated on two occasions that Section 99B-4(3) is a codification of the
doctrine of contributory negligence, a doctrine which is generally
more broad, and often much different, than the product misuse
defense,"" 2 the Fourth Circuit focused instead on whether the
plaintiffs " 'failed to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances... .' ". "
The Fontenot majority responded that unlike Turner, the
plaintiffs in Jones were still using the product in some manner."4 But
by equating the Jones plaintiffs' actions with respect to the asbestos as
"use" of the asbestos, the majority suggests a very loose definition of
"use" at odds with the majority's isolated and hyper-literal
interpretation of the word in Fontenot. Specifically, if working "with
and around Kaylo pipe-covering and block, which are OFC asbestos
products,""' constitutes "use" of those products, then a plaintiff
would "use" a product anytime he knowingly comes into contact with
the product. Under this definition, Turner arguably "used" TI's
107. Id. at 340-41.
108. 69 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 1995).
109. Id. at 715-16.
110. Id. at 720.
111. Id. at 721-22.
112. Id. at 721 n.13 (citing Dalrymple v. Sinkoe, 230 N.C. 453, 53 S.E.2d 437 (1949);
A.T. & T. Corp. v. Med. Review of N.C., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 91, 93 (E.D.N.C. 1995)).
113. Id. at 722.
114. Fontenot v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 736 F.3d 318, 329 (4th Cir. 2013).
115. Jones, 69 F.3d at 716 (emphasis added).
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product when he chose to advance towards the police officer knowing
that the officer had a taser aimed at his chest. Moreover, then, he
certainly "used" TI's product when he continued to walk around the
store while the taser's darts were attached to his chest and discharging
an electrical current near his heart. Thus, even if we assume the
Fontenot majority's use rule was truly part of North Carolina
contributory negligence law, to the extent that the Jones plaintiffs
"used" the asbestos insulation, so too did Turner "use" TI's taser.
The other proximate cause arguments the majority offered for
why the contributory negligence defense should not apply in Fontenot
are even less faithful, not only to previous North Carolina case law,
but also to the facts of the Fontenot case itself. First, the majority's
argument that nothing Turner did caused the officer to aim the taser
at Turner's chest"' is both inaccurate and irrelevant. This is especially
clear when Turner is compared to the plaintiff in Braswell."7 The
Braswell plaintiff "knew [the mob was] acting in an unruly and
unlawful manner and that the officer had warned them to stop trying
to break in the doors.""' Still, "he voluntarily became a member of
the crowd . .. and was rejoining the crowd ... when he was shot"-
accidentally-by a ricocheting bullet fired from the security officer's
gun."9 The officer was not even aiming the gun at the plaintiff when
the plaintiff was shot; moreover, there was no evidence that the
plaintiff knew the officer had a gun, let alone that he was about to fire
it.'20 Nevertheless, the court found that a reasonable person looking
out for his own safety would not engage in mob activity.'2 ' The
relevant proximate cause inquiry was only whether the plaintiff's
actions could "reasonably be calculated to provoke the security
officer into taking some action to disperse the mob"-not whether the
plaintiff's actions were reasonably calculated to provoke the officer
into taking action with respect to a particular part of the plaintiff's
body.122
Similar to the Braswell plaintiff, the officer told Turner to leave
the Food Lion premises and Turner knew that by remaining in the
store, shouting, cursing, and acting aggressively, he was acting in an
unruly manner, which the officer had warned him to stop.123
116. Fontenot, 736 F.3d. at 330.
117. Braswell v. N.C. A & T State Univ., 5 N.C. App. 1, 168 S.E.2d 24 (1969).
118. Id. at 12, 168 S.E.2d at 31.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 9, 168 S.E.2d at 29.
121. Id. at 12, 168 S.E.2d at 30.
122. Id. at 12, 168 S.E.2d at 31 (emphasis added).
123. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, Turner voluntarily continued this behavior.124
Moreover, unlike the Braswell plaintiff, Turner knew the officer had a
taser.'2 Turner knew the taser was aimed at his chest.126 Turner knew
the taser was discharging into his chest as he continued to walk
around the store despite the officer's instructions to get down.127 Even
granting that Turner did not cause the officer to aim the taser at his
chest in the first place, the officer's aiming of the taser is not what
caused Turner to suffer ventricular fibrillation.' What caused Turner
to suffer ventricular fibrillation was the discharging of the taser-and
it was Turner's behavior that caused the officer to discharge, and then
to continue discharging, the taser.129 Thus, under both the facts of the
case and North Carolina law, Turner's actions contributed to his
death.
Second, the court's argument that Turner's actions did not
foreseeably contribute to his death because Turner did not know and
had no reason to know that being tased could result in severe cardiac
injury3 o is an even more direct contradiction of North Carolina case
law. According to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, "[i]t is not
required that the injury in the precise form in which it occurred
should have been foreseeable but only that, in the exercise of
reasonable care, consequences of a generally injurious nature might
have been expected."'"' As Chief Judge Traxler noted, Turner, by
voluntarily engaging in unruly conduct just as the Braswell plaintiff
did, assumed the risk of whatever injury he might receive as a
result.'32
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF FONTENOT
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of North Carolina's law is not
only unfaithful, but also overly broad compared to the policy goal it
was designed to advance. Following the majority's "use" rule in other
cases would lead to outcomes clearly contrary to the goal of
contributory negligence.
124. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 74 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 54-68, 74 and accompanying text.
130. Fontenot v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 736 F.3d 318, 330 (4th Cir. 2013).
131. McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 236, 192 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1972) (emphasis
added).
132. Fontenot, 736 F.3d at 339 (Traxler, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Braswell v. N.C. A &
T State Univ., 5 N.C. App. 1, 12, 168 S.E.2d 24,31 (1969)).
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The majority argued for the "use" rule as a way to prevent TI
from achieving what the majority feared would be virtual immunity
from suit. 3 As the majority realized, TI was a unique defendant in
that its products-tasers-were specifically designed and marketed
for use against citizens like Turner who engage in disputes and refuse
to submit to authority.134 Any injuries these citizens received as a
result of their tasing would, by definition, be the result of
"contributory negligence.""' Thus, the citizens most at risk of being
injured by TI's products would be automatically barred from
recovering against TI. With none of its most likely victims able to
hold TI accountable, TI would, by the majority's reasoning,
"essentially have no duty in North Carolina to safely design its
products or to provide adequate warnings to law enforcement
customers."' 6 The "use" rule that the Fourth Circuit advanced
effectively avoids this outcome.
The problem is that this particular outcome is not a danger in
every products liability negligence case, yet the rule designed
specifically to avoid this outcome will still apply. Most defendants in
products liability suits are not like TI-most do not specialize in
products designed for use against negligent people. Thus, for most
products liability defendants, there will be a sizeable pool of non-
negligent plaintiffs able to hold those defendants liable for their
products. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's "use" rule would still
apply to those defendants, subjecting them to liability in ways that
would make a mockery of North Carolina's contributory negligence
rule.
Consider, for example, a plaintiff who walks through a roped off
construction area and is injured when a defective nail gun operated by
a nearby construction worker backfires. Under the Fontenot
majority's "use" rule, this plaintiff can recover against the nail gun
manufacturer, who will be barred from bringing up the plaintiff's
contributory negligence because the plaintiff did not "use" the nail
gun. Meanwhile, other plaintiffs-perhaps construction workers
injured on the job, who committed no negligence-are also suing and
recovering against the nail gun manufacturer. Under the "use" rule,
however, the contributorily negligent plaintiff can recover just as
much as these non-negligent plaintiffs. The "use" rule, instead of
punishing the negligent plaintiff as contributory negligence is
133. See supra Part II.B.
134. Fontenot, 736 F.3d at 331.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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designed to do, rewards him with a recovery even larger than what a
comparative negligence rule would theoretically allow.' Moreover,
instead of protecting the nail gun manufacturer from liability as
contributory negligence is designed to do, the "use" rule punishes the
manufacturer and forces it to pay extra damages.
Similarly, consider a pedestrian who jaywalks and is hit by a car
whose brakes malfunctioned. Under the majority's "use" rule,
plaintiff jaywalker can recover against the brake manufacturer, who
will be barred from bringing up the plaintiff's contributory negligence
because the plaintiff did not "use" the brakes. Meanwhile, other
plaintiffs-perhaps drivers injured when their brakes failed, who
committed no negligence-are also suing and recovering against the
nail gun manufacturer. Under the "use" rule, however, the jaywalker
can recover just as much as these non-negligent plaintiffs. Again, the
"use" rule, instead of punishing the jaywalker for his negligence,
rewards him with a recovery even larger than what a comparative
negligence rule would theoretically allow. And instead of protecting
the brake manufacturer from liability, the "use" rule punishes the
manufacturer by forcing it to pay extra damages.
Finally, consider the Braswell hypothetical mentioned above.
The hypothetical Braswell plaintiff joins the mob trying to force open
the gym doors and is shot when the security officer's gun misfires due
to a defect in the gun itself. Under the majority's "use" rule, this
plaintiff can recover against the gun manufacturer, who will be barred
from bringing up the plaintiff's contributory negligence because the
plaintiff did not "use" the gun. Meanwhile, other plaintiffs are already
suing the gun manufacturer-perhaps gun users injured when their
guns misfired-who committed no negligence. Thus, the
contributorily negligent plaintiff could recover just as much as these
non-negligent plaintiffs. In the real Braswell case, the security officer,
unlike the hypothetical gun manufacturer, was able to escape all
liability (despite being negligent in his wrongful firing of the gun), and
the real plaintiff was able to recover nothing (despite being identical
to the plaintiff in the hypothetical). In other words, in addition to
producing results that undermine contributory negligence's goals of
punishing negligent plaintiffs and protecting manufacturers from
liability, the "use" rule also allows similar and even identical parties
to receive vastly different treatment under the law. 138
137. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
138. Critics could argue that differential treatment of similar parties is appropriate
when the legal basis for the parties' claims-ordinary common negligence instead of
statutory products liability-is not the same. That is, it might make sense to allow the
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In sum, the Fourth Circuit's "use" rule in Fontenot leaves plenty
of doubt that, in a negligence suit brought under North Carolina's
Products Liability Act, "[a plaintiff's] contributory negligence will bar
his recovery to the same extent as in any other negligence case."19
The solution is not to carve out exceptions to contributory negligence
as the Fourth Circuit attempted, but to replace North Carolina's
contributory negligence rule with some form of comparative
negligence. The "greater than 50%" approach seems to be the best
candidate. This approach, which allows plaintiffs to recover when
their negligence is less than or equal to the defendant's, is the least
dramatic departure from North Carolina's current contributory
negligence scheme and is also sufficient to alleviate the Fourth
Circuit's policy concerns in Fontenot.
A "pure" comparative negligence approach would require the
most dramatic deviation from North Carolina's current contributory
negligence rule. Pure comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to
recover even if he was more negligent than the defendant.'" Such an
approach solves the Fourth Circuit's policy concern in Fontenot
because it would absolutely allow negligent plaintiffs like Turner to
Braswell plaintiff to recover against the hypothetical gun manufacturer in a products
liability negligence suit, but not against the security guard in a common law negligence
suit.
Perhaps a defendant's single act of negligence carries with it a greater potential
for harm to others when it occurs in the context of a mass-produced and widely distributed
product, and it is this greater potential for harm that justifies increased liability via the
denial of otherwise available defenses. Thus, though the hypothetical gun manufacturer's
negligence and the security guard's negligence might seem equal at first, when one
considers that the gun manufacturer's negligence could harm significantly more people
than the security guard's negligence ever could, it seems logical that the gun manufacturer
should be subjected to more liability.
But even if disparate treatment of the defendant gun manufacturer and the
defendant security guard may be theoretically justified, disparate treatment of two
plaintiffs who engaged in exactly the same behavior is not. The justification for treating
the two plaintiffs differently would be society's interest in duly punishing manufacturers
who endanger thousands of consumers by negligently mass-producing products. But the
larger number of plaintiffs with standing to sue the gun manufacturer (compared to the
number of plaintiffs with standing to sue the security guard) creates more liability in itself.
The danger of rewarding negligent plaintiffs who happen to be able to sue under products
liability is not worth the marginal benefit to society of forcing manufacturers to pay a little
more in damages than what they're already paying their numerous non-negligent
plaintiffs. The fairer and more appropriate solution that allows manufacturers to be held
more responsible while still discouraging negligent behavior on the part of plaintiffs is
comparative negligence.
139. Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 672, 268 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1980)
(quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 670 (4th ed.
1971)).
140. Swisher, supra note 1, at 365.
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recover against TI. However, of all the comparative negligence
schemes, pure comparative negligence would most reward negligent
plaintiffs and least protect defendant manufacturers. Because pure
comparative negligence so poorly serves the policy concerns fueling
North Carolina's contributory negligence rule, it seems unlikely that
North Carolina would even consider adopting pure comparative
negligence. If North Carolina were Goldilocks, and the range of
comparative negligence schemes were porridge, pure comparative
negligence would probably be "too hot."
On the other hand, a "50% or greater" approach would require
the least dramatic deviation from North Carolina's current
contributory negligence rule. The "50% or greater" approach
prevents a plaintiff whose negligence was fifty percent or greater than
the defendant's from recovering; in other words, an equally negligent
plaintiff cannot recover against an equally negligent defendant.141
However, such an approach would probably not solve the Fourth
Circuit's policy concern in Fontenot because it might not allow
plaintiffs as negligent as Turner to recover against TI. This, of course,
is based on the assumption that a jury would probably find plaintiffs
like Turner at least equally as negligent as TI. In sum, a "50% or
greater" approach would probably be "too cold."
That leaves the "greater than 50%" approach, which prevents
only those plaintiffs whose negligence was greater than fifty percent
from recovering. Assuming a jury could find Turner no more than
equally negligent, this approach would solve the Fourth Circuit's
policy concern by allowing plaintiffs like Turner to recover against TI.
At the same time, this approach would bar a plaintiff from recovery
whenever the plaintiff's negligence exceeded the defendant's. In sum,
the rule would discourage both plaintiff and defendant negligence
while still completely shielding manufacturers from liability in many
cases. Thus, the "greater than 50%" approach would probably be
"just right" for a state like North Carolina stubbornly clinging to the
contributory negligence priorities of protecting defendant industries
and not rewarding negligent plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Under North Carolina's contributory negligence law, defendants
like TI will too often escape liability for the damages their products
cause. The solution to this inequitable result is not to carve out
exceptions to the contributory negligence rule. Exceptions like the
141. Id. at 365-66.
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Fourth Circuit's "use" rule inspire a false sense of security about
contributory negligence because they allow consumers to believe that
the rule is not really that harsh or capable of producing such extreme
results. Additionally, under the Fourth Circuit's holding, plaintiffs
like the real Braswell plaintiff-barred from recovering against the
security officer-and the hypothetical Braswell plaintiff-free to
recover against the gun manufacturer-would receive blatantly
disparate treatment despite engaging in exactly the same negligent
behavior. In other circumstances, clearly negligent plaintiffs-like the
citizen who walked through a clearly marked construction zone-
would be able to recover just as much as clearly non-negligent
plaintiffs-like the construction workers in the first hypothetical. The
solution is to carve out the rule of contributory negligence itself and
replace it with some form of comparative negligence. The "greater
than 50%" approach seems to be the best candidate for North
Carolina.
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